FSP - Rational Choice Theory

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    Preferences for honesty can support cooperation
    (John Wiley & Sons, 2023-04-16) Szekely, Aron; Bruner, David; Steinmo, Sven; Volintiru, Clara; Andrighetto, Giulia; Todor, Arpad
    Many collective action problems are inherently linked to honesty. By deciding to behave honestly, people contribute to solving the collective action problem. We use a laboratory experiment from two sites (n = 331 and n = 319) to test whether honest preferences can drive cooperation and whether these preferences can be differentially activated by framing. Subjects participate in an asymmetric information variant of the public goods game in one of two treatments that vary only in their wording: The Contribution Frame uses a standard public good game framing, while in the Honesty Frame, words aimed to trigger honesty are used. We measure subjects' honesty in three ways using the (i) sender–receiver task, (ii) the die-roll task, and (iii) self-reported honesty levels and account for other-regarding preferences and social norms to disentangle key alternative motives. We find that all three measures of honesty preferences robustly predict contributions, as do other-regarding preferences and empirical expectations but not normative expectations. Additionally, honesty preferences predict contributions in the Honesty Frame but not in the Contribution Frame, although the difference between these is not consistently significant. Finally, we find no differences in average cooperation across the treatments.
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    Assessing the fairness of the EU Council qualified majority voting : a voting power critical perspective of the liberal intergovernmentalist accounts
    (Servizo de Publicacións, Universidade da Coruna, 2023) Ion, Oana Andreea
    The Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) used by the Council of the European Union developed to a high degree of complexity from one modifying treaty to another, until the latest definition stipulated in the Treaty of Lisbon. This paper analyses this EU intra-institutional voting method using a rational choice approach and emphasizes that there aresituations when not even the institutions, as rational actors, can avoid a collective irrational outcome even when they are addressing subjects such as voting power distribution. It also addresses several shortcomings of the Liberal Intergovernmentalist explanatory framework focusing on the insufficiently developed level of credible institutional commitments. The core part of the article consists in investigating several types of EU Council internal decision-making options, proposing how they can be designed to be considered in the same time fair and efficient, and in analysing how close this voting power ideal type configuration is to the current decisional system.