FSP - Political Philosophy

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    Collective choice in Aristotle
    (Springer, 2019) Miroiu, Adrian; Partenie, Cătălin
    In his Politics VI 3, 1318a–b, Aristotle discusses constitutional procedures for achieving justice in a society where its classes have different views on it. He ana- lyzes the case of a society consisting in two groups, the poor and the rich, each hold- ing a specific understanding of justice (democratic or oligarchic). In this paper we give, first, a non-formal summary of this section of Politics. Then we approach it in the framework of social choice theory and argue that a social rule for selecting between alternatives may be extracted from it. As Aristotle argued, this rule is con- sistent with the views on justice and equality of the supporters of both democracy and oligarchy. Finally, we study its properties, as well as some extensions of it when multiple classes are allowed or more than two alternatives are present.
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    Justice and ideas in Plato’s Republic
    (De Gruyter, 2019) Partenie, Cătălin
    Plato argues in the Republic that in both the city and the soul, justice is the well- functioning of their parts. There are now plenty of books about the well- functioning of organizations, cities, and one’s psyche, but their authors do not call it “justice”. One such book, published in French in 2017 (under the title Foutez-vous la paix!, by Fabrice Midal), goes even further and claims that to reach inner peace and psychic well-functioning we have to stop reasoning completely. Anyway, why does Plato insist that justice is, in both city and soul, the well-functioning of their parts? This is the main question I shall address in my essay.
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    Legitimitatea dizidentei : nesupunerea civica si ratiunea publica rawlsiana
    (SNSPA, 2009) Dobrei, Nicolae
    The tension between fundamental human rights and democratic (majoritarian) legitimacy is both critical and analytically rich for contemporary normative theories of democracy – and for the issue of morally acceptable civil disobedience as well. I briefly discuss the challenge this tension raises for three of the mainstream approaches to this issue, namely republicanism, liberalism and deliberative democracy. I move then to a detailed account of the early Rawlsian justification of civil disobedience, and in the third step of my argument I advance the idea that Rawls’ theory of public reason offers a particularly strong framework for understanding disobedience as an effective means for promoting justice and legitimacy in contemporary democracies.
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    Pluralist welfare egalitarianism and the expensive tastes objection
    (Springer Nature, 2016) Volacu, Alexandru; Dervis, Oana Alexandra
    In this article we aim to reduce the force of the expensive tastes objection to equality of welfare by constructing a pluralist welfare egalitarian theory which is not defeated by it. In the first part, we argue that Cohen’s condition of responsibility-sensitiveness is not able to provide a satisfactory rebuttal of the expensive tastes objection for at least a class of theories of justice, namely those that adhere to a methodologically fact-sensitive view. In the second part, we explore the possibility of constructing a welfare egalitarian theory that gives weight to both equality and efficiency. We propose two alternatives, which integrate a utilitarian constraint and a Weak Pareto constraint on equality and show that both theories consistently differentiate between compensable and non-compensable expensive tastes, but should ultimately be rejected because of other unattractive implications. Finally, we develop a fairness-constrained theory of welfare egalitarianism and suggest that it can distinguish between compensable and noncompensable expensive tastes in both a conceptually consistent and a morally plausible manner, without generating decisive additional objections.