A Sufficientarian Proposal for Discharging Our Moral Duties Towards Emigrants

Abstract

In this article I investigate the nature of the moral duties that citizens of a legitimate state have towards emigrants. A large part of the literature dedicated to the normative study of the migration phenomenon focuses on two major topics: the brain drain phenomenon and the legitimacy of restricting immigrations. If the first of these concerns the moral obligations that individuals have towards a state and their co-nationals, the second regards the policies that a state can justifiably adopt in order to manage migration flows. With the exception of temporary labor migration, less discussed in the literature are the moral duties that we have towards those citizens who chose to emigrate. My answer is that a state has neither more, nor less responsibilities towards its emigrants than it has towards the other citizens. However, the particular way that it can discharge those duties have to pay attention to each citizen’s particular situation, so that public policies dealing specifi cally with the emigrants are required. If we embrace a sufficientarian position, we could see how public policies have to be forged in order to be morally justifiable. I compare in the article two potential ways in which a state could try to discharge its moral duties towards emigrants. The first consists in promoting policies that focus on reverse migration. The second is based on cooperating with host societies and ensuring that emigrants’ rights and well-being are protected to the fullest degree. I argue that the second proposal is the one that can be morally defended, and is in line with moral defenses of reformed temporary labor migration programs which would take into account the rights and legitimate interests of migrants.