

# Eurolimes

**Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies  
“Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence**

**University of Oradea**

**University of Debrecen**

Volume 38

***Cross-Border Cooperation – A Tool for Increasing Social Cohesion***

Edited by  
**Constantin-Vasile ȚOCA, Mihai MARIAN, Klára CZIMRE**

References by  
**Edina MÉSZÁROS & Salome DUNDUA**



Autumn 2025



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Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies  
“Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence

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Autumn 2025

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## ***Cross-Border Cooperation – A Tool for Increasing Social Cohesion***

Edited by **Constantin-Vasile ȚOCA, Mihai MARIAN, Klára CZIMRE**

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## Focus

***George Angheloiu*** (Bucureşti) ◀▶ *Weimarisation of the European Public Space*



## Weimarisation of the European Public Space

George ANGLIȚOIU<sup>299</sup>

**Abstract.** *In the interwar period, democracy, centrism and political self-moderation failed especially in Germany under the pressure of totalist values brought forth by the extremes of Nazism and Communism. The Republic of Weimar, despite its good promises and expectations, crashed under the joint actions of the exceptionalists of the day, Hitler and Stalin, and the world experienced the losses, destructions and horrors of a second global war. Ridden by the current lot of autocratic charismatics, the new wave of Weimarisation tends to engulf the EU in a struggle for survival. The bitter lesson of WWII was that democracy is given a chance only after the systemic failures of offensive war. In order to Make Europe Good Again, the EU citizens do not need MEGA solutions promised by illiberalism but a comeback to commitment and respect for peaceful resolution of differences.*

**Keywords:** *Weimarisation, MEGA (Make Europe Great Again), Illiberalism, Demokratura, Businessocracy*

### ***The handbook of abusing history***

One of the standard but often forgotten truisms is that history never lies but could be lied about. Throughout the ages owning history has been a priority especially for leaders aiming to optimise or compensate reality with artefacts and adjudgments of the desired past legitimising present and future. When dealing with manipulation of the past, it should be acknowledged that not only the winners write “official” history but also the losers, later on, if and when given the chance to do so. Abusing is caring by other means and this applies to history also because rewriting and adapting history to one community’s needs could come out as a patriotic or loyalist duty to the very identity and prestige of a political group. Boasting rhetorics like making something great again also means making something else small again. Renaming places, making geostrategic offers or claims, and postulating reenactment of golden ages could come in handy for those exceptionalist leaders willing to make history either by war or by the prequel of it – bullying diplomacy.

History has been used for good reasons to settle disputes and create frameworks for international peace and stability but only and if agreed upon by the signatory powers of treaties, regardless of future discontent and revisionist goals of those eager to see the past only on their terms of conquest and domination.

### ***Totalism***

This concept represents the most appropriate theoretical approach for dealing with political myths inspired by approximate facts of history misused to proclaim past golden ages in order to inspire mobilisation for similar great and immediate future. But renovating present time is a daunting task, often described by its promoters as sacrificial and salvational, which requires activism and denial of ambiguity. In turn, the purge of ambiguity should trigger the exclusion of centrism as political option based on setting up a common denominator as middle ground between extremes. Therefore, history offers many examples of how easier it was to convert opposite radicals than accept moderates, the interwar period

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showcasing how socialist militants were adverse to national socialists who in turn fought against national communists and so on, cyclically, only for some of them, including leaders, to change sides and become ardent sympathisers of the opposite, under the mirage and opportunity of forging new but historic destiny.

### ***The failed experiment of the Weimar Republic***

In the interwar period, democracy, centrism and political self-moderation failed especially in Germany under the pressure of totalist values brought forth by the political extremes of Nazism and Communism. The Weimar Republic,<sup>300</sup> despite its good promises and expectations, crashed under the joint actions of the exceptionalists of the day, Hitler and Stalin, and the world experienced the losses and horrors of a second global war. But the democratic failure has also to be understood in the context of maximalist demands of France, the main Western continental victor in the first world war, the war debt imposed on Germany and the overall revanchism promoted by Paris severely undermining Berlin's capacity to transition from imperial expansionist rule to democratic pacifist government. The Weimar Republic was characterised by inner shortcomings and inefficiencies but nonetheless represented the first true attempt at democratic rule by non-aristocratic privileges or constitutional preservation of monarchic unilateralism. The democratic constitution of the Weimar Republic instituted true universal suffrage, meaning for both men and women, aged similarly over 20. Thus, postbellum Germany became one of the most advanced countries for women's rights of that time, many representative feminine figures excelling in various domains of the public sphere.

The constitutional regime was complemented by a Bill of Rights which guaranteed political and religious freedoms, and equality before the law for all citizens. The successor to the Second Reich was committed more to the benefits of its citizens, rather than their expandable nature in wars of aggression, and bore the traits of a welfare state. To that effect, the government introduced and expanded vast and enhanced social programs, including pensions, sickness benefits, and unemployment insurance. Also, it embarked on undertaking public works projects like accessible housing and community parks in order to rejuvenate and rehabilitated urban areas.

From a foreign policy perspective, the Republic of Weimar was not a role model<sup>301</sup> in terms of seeking peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts but prioritised diplomacy<sup>302</sup> over war in order to comeback to importance in the international society that was shaping up after The Great War which had brought so much destruction and none of its promises for imperial Berlin. Therefore, it contributed to many of the international initiatives seeking dialogue and limitation of armaments and complied to the territorial losses, financial penalties and general limitations imposed on it by the Treaty of Versailles.

### ***The cyclical comeback to Weimar***

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<sup>300</sup> For a general but detailed assessment of the Weimar Republic, including the thesis that the rise of extremism was not inescapable by default but the aggregated effect of complex national, plus foreign agents, factors, dynamics and powers, see Hans Mommsen, *The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy* Kindle edition (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017).

<sup>301</sup> While actively engaged in seeking status restoration in international relations, the Weimar Republic sought nonetheless alternative solutions in order to secure its interests in Eastern Europe by agreeing in 1922 the Treaty of Rapallo with the pariah of the international society, the Soviet Union (defined as "the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic and its allies"). Secret military clauses, circumventing the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles were inserted in the treaty providing for joint military exercises and development of the defense industrial base which contributed to German rearmament and foreshadow the surprise Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939. See German-Russian Agreement; April 16, 1922 (Treaty of Rapallo), Yale Law School. Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project, accessed October 26, 2025, [https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/rapallo\\_001.asp](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/rapallo_001.asp).

<sup>302</sup> Noteworthy in this regard was the personality of Gustav Stresemann, chancellor (1923), foreign minister (1923, 1924–1929) of the Weimar Republic, awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1926, jointly with the French foreign minister Aristide Briand for promoting reconciliation and diplomacy in bilateral and world affairs. For his overall role as the most effective decision-maker in the efforts to contain Hitler's totalitarian rise, see Jonathan Wright, *Gustav Stresemann. Weimar's Greatest Statesman*, Kindle edition (Oxford University Press, 2004).

Ridden by a new lot of autocratic charismatics, the new wave of Weimarisation tends to engulf the EU in a struggle for survival. Recent reports and surveys (e.g. Austria<sup>303</sup>) present an escalation of far-right radicalism by around 25 percent compared to previous year. In such a context, a peculiar supplementary development is the fact that the new extremists (pro-Putin, pro-*special military operations*) are pitted against the old extremists (anti-Kremlin, pro-Ukraine) when it comes to their incoherent perspective on regional and global affairs.

But such a historical pattern should not overlook the impact of fundamentalist radicals who distinct from regular extremists pose their own challenge to constitutionalism and democracy which in their totalist playbook have no relevance when compared to the mandatory self-sufficiency of Sharia.<sup>304</sup>

During the initial presentation in conference of my taking points on the topic, the audience raised two relevant questions which will address here as well.

Q1: *Given the cyclical nature of political extremism and its resurgence in European public spaces, do you see historical awareness as a viable tool to counteract Weimarisation, or is it inherently limited by the emotional appeal of totalist narratives?*

A1: History and civic education should be the cornerstones of better and inclusive education of younger generations in order to foster good citizenship ethics. The past false promises and catastrophic results of aggressive politics should be learned in school. Moderation should not be confused for weak use of coercion by lawful means.

Q2: *You highlight the crumbling of centrist positions and the polarisation of political discourse. In this context, how can democratic institutions effectively promote moderation without appearing weak or ineffective in the face of rising autocratic charismatic movements?*

A2: Democratic institutions should find solutions to mitigate the impact of imbalance between the few very rich and the so many at risk of losing the basic means of subsistence. Democracy is not very resilient when faced with economic uncertainty and crisis as seen during the first global economic crisis of 1929–1933 which contributed greatly to the demise of the Weimar Republic.

### ***Pillow democracy***

The bitter lesson of the second world war still is that democracy is given a chance only after the systemic failures of offensive war. Re(learning) the language and practice of democracy take at least two social and political groups, and requires time and diligence in society.

Weimarisation was a complex political and security set of dynamics which exponentially reflected many of the inner and outer challenges to democracy and stability. After millennia of stratocracy, autocracy, monarchy, theocracy, dictatorship, imperium, and other forms and denominations of unrestricted rule by a few, ‘chosen’ ones, democracy still is and feels like the odd system of sharing power. Regardless of ideology, “power to the people” has seldom come through the ages on virtues of peaceful transitions and turns of political dominion.

Borrowing a legal notion from corporate affairs, *ultimate beneficial owner*, it can be reached the conclusion that some democratically elected officials distrust the very system that has empowered them. Why so? How come? Just picture the large role to which a President of the Board or Chief Executive Officer are entitled to. Then compare it to the limited role in scope and time attributed constitutionally to a post-modern democratic leader: 2 terms in office, of usually 4-5 years, and then the risk of political oblivion. Being a former and not an incumbent is not something to be desired by the post-Aristotelian

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<sup>303</sup> See for instance Direktion Staatsschutz und Nachrichtendienst, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2024*, Bundesministerium für Inneres, Wien, 2025, accessed October 19, 2025, [https://www.dsn.gv.at/501/files/VSB/205\\_2025\\_VSB\\_2024\\_V20250929\\_webBF.pdf](https://www.dsn.gv.at/501/files/VSB/205_2025_VSB_2024_V20250929_webBF.pdf).

<sup>304</sup> For a comprehensive analysis of penal patterns of Jihadi terrorism, right-wing terrorism, left-wing and anarchist terrorism, ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism, and violent extremism for all of them, including other and unspecified ones, in the EU, see EUROPOL, *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2025*, (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2025), accessed October 29, 2025, [https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU\\_TE-SAT\\_2025.pdf](https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU_TE-SAT_2025.pdf).

political animal. Regular standards of democracy asking for power-sharing and limitations of terms in order to prevent tyranny of one or few stand in the way of the most ambitious of them, eager and able to get rid of them by overt or greyish challenges and changes to constitutional system, with excuses of justifications of popular demand or urgent national imperatives.

Education plays a critical role in underpinning a democratic regime especially when confronted with hostile propaganda based on fake news. While hybrid wars are not that new as theorists, media analysts and recent strategies claim, but have been used since ancient times, better education for young pupils has not been around for a similar amount of time. Understanding the fundamentals of democracy requires institutionalisation of rigorous, proportionate and unbiased teaching in order to showcase both the merits and defects of politics and policies, including open society and democracy. But when teachers and educational organisations, which are supposed to be role models, become too entrenched in militancy and reject ethical self-moderation,<sup>305</sup> the outcomes could have major adverse effects on the future of society.

Political pluralism is a major trait of democracy but in the last years has been severely challenged by the charismatic illiberals of sorts. The Western traditional system of bipartisanship on major topics of the political agenda has been undermined especially in the US under the initial impact of first Trump administration and emergence to power of the MAGA movement. No late afterwards, such trends have been replicated in the EU, political polarisation and diminishing of large bipartisan coalitions of democratic parties impacting governmental stability and endurance. Under the assault of populists, the European Commissions of the last two presidents have still managed to be based on majority building in the European Parliament among the most important two political families (Christian Democrats and Socialists) whose clout has nonetheless steadily declined to an all-time low, manifest in the European elections of 2024. Combined with national resurgence of nazi or fascist nostalgics or re-enablers in the most important Western European democracies, plus the constant endurance of communist appeal, such trends add new layers to the overall decline of pluralism as key to safeguard for democracy on the basis of reaching common denominators or rotation of power.

### ***The crumbling of the Centre-right***

Tackling the MAGA movement will not be easy by the moderates of the centre-right either in the United States or Europe. The American dream is exceptionalism by other means, therefore prone to MAGA-like ideologies based on Tea Party-like carving out of the GOP. In order to understand the origins and magnitude of MAGA it should be stated that this slogan was a Reagan and not Trump electoral campaign proposal. A closer look into its evolution has to observe the overall misleading dependency of Trump's rhetoric on the legitimising patterns of Reagan administration's ideology. With roots in the ultra-religious social-conservatism within the Republican Party in the '60s (as a reaction to the Democratic Party's reach to younger American generations under the spell of the Kennedy administration), MAGA has taken over the GOP and reshape it in the mould of what it takes to be an absolute follower of Trump and his personalised erratic politics. What began as a curiosity with slim chances of electoral success, transformed radically into a one-man drive inside the GOP presidential primaries traditionally run until then by more predictable groups and even families of conservatives.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the Brexit was happening simultaneously. After containing the Scottish movement for independence in a troublesome referendum, and winning by a high margin the general elections of 2015, prime minister David Cameron miscalculated the leverage of a new referendum by which to settle the outstanding British grievances against the EU. The very fact that his cabinet was split in their allegiance for or against Brexit, marked the drift which was engulfing the Conservative Party under the impact of internal firebrands like Boris Johnson or Nigel Farage-type of demagogues acting

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<sup>305</sup> Take for instance the negative practice in Romanian universities of rectors with unlimited number of terms. Some of them serve also as ministers, and in order to secure their positions as undisputed heads of universities they suspend themselves for the duration of the ministerial mandate which contributes to decisional vacuums and inefficiencies, and leads to personification of institutional power.

from outside the Tory circles but aiming to overcome the British centre-right. The debacle which followed the surprising defeat for “Remain” was welcomed not only by Trump but also the “sovereignists” of Europe eager to emulate what they saw as a useful precedent of liberation from the constraints of regulation and oversized supranational/federal-like government. But “taking back control” proved to be a messy political affair, the Tory governments of Theresa May and Boris Johnson zigzagging with many hardships and losses of credibility out of the EU. By the end of the 2010s, an insignificant Eurosceptic and far-right populist party like UKIP (now Reform) transformed on the back of Tory failures into a threatening force for the very existence of moderate conservatism. Promises of DOGE-like reforms similar to MAGA, and inner fears of right-wing politicians to avoid losing out on the next route to electoral success, have brought Farage demagoguery to the forefront of British politics with a view to winning next general elections,<sup>306</sup> eventually an alliance of convenience with a declining, carved out Conservative Party.

### *The excesses of the Centre-left*

The enduring false appeal of Communism despite historical facts represents a defining characteristic of the post-Cold War period. Leftist intelligentsia seems to be untouched by the huge amount of historical evidence portraying each and every Communist regime of Eastern Europe and beyond as genocidal and anti-democratic. The fascination with Communism as the perfect political regime (maybe not properly implemented by ineffective or traitorous leaders) continues to exert appeal to Western political circles which have not directly experienced the horrors of real Communism. Starting with student age and ending up in regular, mature political age, Communism has had a continuous existence and electoral success, albeit marginal. Consolidated democracies like France, Italy, Germany or Greece still experiment with the parliamentary attraction of Communism. If we consider for example the current status of the leader of the French Communist Party, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the biased, misbalanced view on world affairs is easily visible, with negative effects on domestic stability and security.<sup>307</sup>

On the other hand, *Cancel culture* wars are not much different than far-right intolerance to diversity of opinions, or rigorous interpretation and contextualisation of facts. History cannot be rewritten to accommodate everyone’s take on the past or need for justice/justification. But if it is respected as a science then it should lead the humankind, regardless of ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, religion or political belief, to a better understanding of human character as complex, imperfect and manifest between good and bad, aiming for positive or malign goals achieved accordingly or not.

### *Remedies*

There are many arguments in favour of the EU as still functional beacon of hope, after providing 75 years of peace among its members which represents the longest such period of time in European history. In order to ***Make Europe Good Again***, the EU citizens do not need MEGA solutions promised by illiberalism but ethical comeback to moderation and respect for peaceful resolution of differences.

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<sup>306</sup> For Reform Party’s electoral forecast and insights on its first, tumultuous months in power at regional level, see Alex Forsyth, “What a UK Government Led by Reform Would Look Like,” *BBC*, 5 November 2025, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cm2kyjrg77eo>.

<sup>307</sup> Regarding accusations of anti-Semitism and support of Islamist, terrorist groups like Hamas, see, for instance, “Mélenchon Condemned as ‘Enemy of the Republic’ over Attacks on French Jewish Organisation,” *Euronews* with AFP, 10.10.2023, <https://www.euronews.com/2023/10/10/melenchon-condemned-as-enemy-of-the-republic-over-attacks-on-french-jewish-organisation>. For an overall media depiction of him as denier of general views on far-left wing leaders (like Venezuelan Presidents Hugo Chavez or Nicolas Maduro) or even nationalistic autocrats (e.g. Vladimir Putin, whom he sees as rightful countermeasure to American hegemony and victim of its propaganda framing him as “threat”), see Alexander Hurst, “Jean-Luc Mélenchon is a Disaster for the French Left – His Response to the Attack on Israel Proves It,” *The Guardian*, 23.10.2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/oct/27/jean-luc-melenchon-french-left-israel-france>.

Firstly, it is wiser to use conceptualisation and not vision for defining public space and society. Despite the fact that many use words like vision, revelation, dream or foresight to describe wisdom and know-how, modernity has outlined the need for science and technology, research and development, to encompass and express proper use of neuronal activity.

Secondly, it is better to use the democratically enacted laws to counter extremism and anarchy. In order for it to be complied with, the European public space needs unbiased education for raising law-abiding citizens, and dissemination of true information for understanding the real nature of facts and things<sup>308</sup>.

Thirdly, it is more trustworthy to promote political dialogue, cooperation and accountability within an already functional union of states and peoples than to revert to the level of secret diplomacy and alliances which lead twice from European concert of powers to world wars.

### ***The external factors***

*Putinisation*<sup>309</sup> should be considered as the main external driver of Weimarisation in the sense that radical political leaders in the EU are trying to emulate/copycat Putin and his active charismatic leadership. On such basis, *Trumpisation*<sup>310</sup> should be counted as the secondary external driver: a Putin emulator imposing a new American way on the EU and its member states' inner politics. Both processes are built upon the impression of a strong ruler's charisma and share the strategic goal of subversion of the democratic fabric of society based on parliamentary rule of law, civilian control over security sector, secularism, moderation and tolerance. In order to achieve such un-democratisation, similar tactics are used: election interference, new media extensive fake news, religious agitation and pseudo-historicism, diplomatic bullying, offensive military posturing potentially or effectively leading to aggression/coercion. But the most important tactic of all is the personalisation of power, leading to the unchallenged, supreme role of the leader, portrayed as seemingly infallible, almighty secular ruler, able and willing to restore the greatness of a golden age.

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<sup>308</sup> See for instance the positive joint initiative of Radio France International, Deutsche Welle and TVP World to create *The Information Shield* to combat disinformation from abroad, especially from Russia and China. Council of the European Union, General Secretariat of the Council, "Note," 15425/1/25, Brussels, 14 November 2025, accessed November 02, 2025, <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15425-2025-REV-1/en/pdf>.

<sup>309</sup> Personal concept defined an autocratic and abusive form of national and international leadership based on the idiosyncratic charisma of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and aiming to restore (at least and at last) the imperial grandeur and status of the Kremlin-based state. For details, see my previous works: George Anglițoiu, "Putinization and Neo-Containment," *Europolity* 12, no. 2 (2018), accessed October 30, 2025, [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=3461881](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461881); George Anglițoiu, "Putinisation and the European Union of Insecurity," *Eurolimes*, 31-32, *The Eastern Borders of the European Union: From Peace to Conflict*, ed. Edina-Lilla Mészáros et al. (Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring-Autumn 2022).

<sup>310</sup> Compare for instance the minimal weight given to Russia as threat and aggressor (at least when paired with previous American official strategies) with the outsized criticism of Europe and the EU in the national security strategy of the second Trump Administration. Self-described as "Trump corollary" to the Monroe doctrine, it sees Europe facing "the prospect of civilizational erasure," setting up a mission for the US as the greatest and most successful nation in history, and preeminent state in the Western Hemisphere to help it "correct its current trajectory". The document identifies only a few positives about Europe, noting "the growing influence of patriotic European parties" giving to the US the mission of "cultivating resistance to Europe's current trajectory within European nations". It also estimates that "censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition," "loss of national identities," low demographics and unwise migration policies will make Europe unrecognisable and many NATO allies "non-European". Its internal incoherence is on display throughout its contents, arguing for instance to accept Middle East leaders "as they are" and seeking "strategic stability" with the Kremlin, which is an "existential threat" mainly from a European, unrealistic perspective (for peace in Ukraine). *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington: The White House, November 2025), accessed October 18, 2025, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf>.

### *The strange case of Elon Musk*

Musk, as ultimate beneficial owner of Tesla, Twitter, Space X, Starlink and other venture capital businesses, is representative for the new type of autocrat built on wealth, new media leverage and strategic state programs, projects and subsidies. He is not the first to try and influence politics (e.g. by behaving like a *Citizen Kane* mogul) but the first having a global agenda with a view to new conquistador-like mentality and goals<sup>311</sup>. In such a mind frame it is not unreasonable to depict him as eager to focus on the *Space* as a kind of *New Indies*, where access and control of resources is granted by him as proprietor of both intergalactic means of transportation and artificial intelligence.

Musk's opportunistic way has been evident in his shifting political choices, stances and donations. A long time Democrat voter in the presidential elections up to 2020, according to his own statements, Musk switched his position on Trump from "not the right guy" (2016) and "it's time for Trump to hang up his hat & sail into the sunset" (2022) to "first buddy" (2024)<sup>312</sup>. But the post-DOGE rift with Trump is the most relevant because it showcased the lack of substance of "same" conservative views which is indicative of the real limits of cooperation the agents of Weimarisation have in their pursuit of exclusive and over-dominant vision on life, people, society, government and power.

It is interesting to use one of Musk's most proffered tools, the AI, in order to quantify his relationship with the EU. In a nutshell, the AI sees Musk as an adversary "due to his public clashes with EU officials, his criticism of the EU's regulations, and his perceived support for right-wing political parties in Europe that challenge the bloc's unity". If we unpack this, what matters is how much such hi-tech scientist and billionaire disregards regulation, enforcement, diversity, equality, integration and all the other values promoted and enshrined not only in the EU treaties and other pieces of legislation but also in the US Constitution and the subsequent acts and bills that made the American democracy so appreciated by theorists like Alexis de Tocqueville and a role model for post-imperial Europe. If we are to identify a red thread into his rhetoric and that of the political leaders he supports is *freedom* as focal concept. This can justify any criticism when something is contrary to his interests, starting up with his non-compliance to medical mandates (because Covid-19 affected his business triggering his bravado of opening up his factories despite lockdown and other restrictions), or digital market norms (when confronted with investigations, fines, and criticism of how he operates new media and rejects fake news content moderation<sup>313</sup>). It also includes the liberty of claiming rightness of far right ideology and practice because such parties, crusaders of truth and virtue, are being oppressed by the EU bureaucracy and member states so eager to surrender Europe to progressive/Communist ideas, economic downturn and migrants perverting its identity.<sup>314</sup> And it can bear no more moral significance when it means an altruist, voluntary

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<sup>311</sup> For a visually humorous but still serious and scientifically based approach on Musk's Mars colonising drive, see Kelly Weinersmith and Zach Weinersmith, "Mars Attacks: How Elon Musk's Plans for Mars Threaten Earth," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 20, 2025, <https://thebulletin.org/2025/03/mars-attacks-how-elon-musks-plans-to-colonize-mars-threaten-earth/>.

<sup>312</sup> For the on-off-on relationship between the world's richest man/"Rocket Man" and the "greatest president God ever created," see for instance Tim Levin et al., "From 'First Buddy' Bromance to a Feud to a Thaw, Here's how Elon Musk and Donald Trump's Relationship Has Evolved," *Business Insider*, Updated November 20, 2025, <https://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-donald-trump-feud-relationship-timeline-2022-7>.

<sup>313</sup> For EU conclusions on Musk's decision to remove preventive measures for pro-Kremlin accounts on Twitter after becoming its owner which contributed significantly (by 36%) to the expansion of Russian war propaganda and disinformation, see European Commission, *Digital Services Act: Application of the Risk Management Framework to Russian Disinformation Campaigns*, 1st edition (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2023). For details on the fine of 120 million euros imposed the European Commission, see European Commission, "Commission fines X €120 million under the Digital Services Act," (Press Release, December 5, 2025), accessed November 04, 2025, [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip\\_25\\_2934](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_2934).

<sup>314</sup> For a comprehensive analysis of Musk's flurry of political interferences in European politics in favour of the far-right parties and activists especially after helping Trump regaining the presidency, but also of its related impact on Tesla declining sales in the respective countries among pro-democracy buyers, see Andrew Macaskill, Andrew R.C. Marshall and Nick Carey, "Musk Rallies the Far Right in Europe. Tesla Is Paying the Price," *Reuters*, 04 March 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/world/musk-rallies-far-right-europe-tesla-is-paying-price-2025-03-04/>. For a detailed

gesture for Ukraine of providing essential Starlink access in the beginning of the Russian aggression, only to be reneged later on when the choice to stay free and to resist invasion tends to become too successful.<sup>315</sup>

Musk's fondness for sci-fi literature can also help us understand better why *real Tony Stark* ("Iron Man"<sup>316</sup>) impersonation<sup>317</sup> is relevant to summarise his political actions as ad-hoc personal/corporate domestic and foreign policy meant to augment his direct and unmitigated *businessocratic* rule of the world anyway, -when, -where he sees fit, which should supplant both historical stratocracy and modern democracy.

### Conclusions

Definable as "general process with spillover pattern of structural weakening and ultimate replacement of the democratic fabric of society and state based on constitutionalism by agents, factors, dynamics and powers which reject plurality, dialogue, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and overall centrism and self-moderation," Weimarisation represents a critical challenge to the very existence of the European public space, physical and digital, and its most recognisable institutionalisation – the European Union of like-minded peoples and states.

Beyond the historical example of the Republic of Weimar which should be not be ignored but studied thoroughly, is the need to acknowledge and act to safeguard the values and principles that make

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analysis of his use of X to boost the credentials of social-media influencers/admirers as the new breed of far-right militants turned politicians with a view to access to EU and national parliamentary or executive branches of power, see Erika Kinnetz and Aaron Kesler, "Musk, a Social Media Powerhouse, Boosts Fortunes of Hard-Right Figures in Europe," *The Associated Press*, 01 August 2025, <https://apnews.com/article/musk-europe-politicians-influence-x-twitter-extremists-89746e1e17bcc134206c14a204efcbce>.

<sup>315</sup> Musk's posture is controversial and contradictory on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict as well, going from providing satellite connectivity to Ukrainian defenders (and being commended for it by President Zelensky) to peace proposals on Twitter which acknowledged Kremlin's right to some of the territories subjected to aggression, especially Crimea "formally part of Russia, as it has been since 1783 (**until Khrushchev's mistake**)". For instances of Musk interfering on the battlefield, see: Joey Roulette, Cassell Bryan-Low and Tom Balmforth, "A Reuters Special Report: Musk Ordered Shutdown of Starlink Satellite Service as Ukraine Retook Territory from Russia," *Reuters*, 25 July 2025, <https://www.reuters.com/investigations/musk-ordered-shutdown-starlink-satellite-service-ukraine-retook-territory-russia-2025-07-25/>. For details of his peace poll for Ukraine and Ukrainian diplomacy furious reaction, see \*\*\*, "Ukraine War: Elon Musk Sparks Fury in Kyiv over Twitter Comments about Crimea and Russia," *Euronews*, 03 October 2022, <https://www.euronews.com/2022/10/03/elon-musk-under-fire-for-inflammatory-ukraine-twitter-comments>.

<sup>316</sup> For his comic book biography and psychological profile (characterised by narcissistic disorder and autistic tendencies), see "Anthony Stark (Earth-616)," *Marvel Database*, accessed October 30, 2025, [https://marvel.fandom.com/wiki/Anthony\\_Stark\\_\(Earth-616\)#Personality](https://marvel.fandom.com/wiki/Anthony_Stark_(Earth-616)#Personality) and Sébastien Chapellon et Florian Houssier, "Iron Man: entre confusion identitaire et addiction à la technologie," *Santé mentale au Québec* 42, no 2, *Trouble mental et travail : accompagnement et inclusion professionnelle pérenne*, ed. Sonia Laberon, Antoinette Prouteau and Marc Corbière (Université de Montréal, Automne 2017), accessed November 06, 2025, <https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/smq/2017-v42-n2-smq03262/1041926ar/>.

<sup>317</sup> Terry Zeller, "Robert Downey Jr. Calls out Elon Musk for 'Cosplaying' as Tony Stark, Hopes He'll 'Control His Behavior'," *Daily Mail*, 22 October 2024, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-13985113/Robert-Downey-Jr-calls-Elon-Musk-cosplaying-Tony-Stark-hopes-hell-control-behavior.html>. Over the last decade, several of his Twitter/X posts alluded to his intentions to build up a Iron Man-like armored suit either for the Pentagon or for his own protection following Trump assassination attempt of July 2024: Elon Musk (@elonmusk), "Something about a flying metal suit...", X, June 09, 2016, [https://x.com/elonmusk/status/740723195431538689?ref\\_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E740723195431538689%7Ctwgr%5Ef4b3eaae7d8fdc20f613c83fcce28abbca4e049%7Ctwcon%5Es1\\_c10&ref\\_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnn.com%2F2016%2F06%2F08%2Fpolitics%2Felon-musk-ash-carter-pentagon](https://x.com/elonmusk/status/740723195431538689?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E740723195431538689%7Ctwgr%5Ef4b3eaae7d8fdc20f613c83fcce28abbca4e049%7Ctwcon%5Es1_c10&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnn.com%2F2016%2F06%2F08%2Fpolitics%2Felon-musk-ash-carter-pentagon) and Elon Musk (@elonmusk), "Maybe it's time to build that flying metal suit of armor," X, July 14, 2024, <https://x.com/elonmusk/status/1812283045069861085>.

united Europe a peaceful and democratic place and not the new battleground for other 7, 30, 80, 100 years, world wars.

Statesmen and citizens alike have the responsibility to protect the common heritage of 80 years of peace, stability and increased prosperity that have encountered many of the crises that have contributed to the demise of the original Weimar Republic but have nonetheless been overcome through wisdom, solidarity and *Europeanness*.

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