

WHAT KIND OF UNION? THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AS SEEN BY CANDIDATES TO THE EC PRESIDENCY IN THE 2014 EP ELECTIONS

Alina BÂRGĂOANU, Elena NEGREA-BUSUIOC
National University of Political Studies and Public Administration
Bucharest, Romania
alina.bargaoanu@comunicare.ro, elena.negrea@comunicare.ro

Abstract

There is no doubt that the European Union is at a crossroads. The recently (arguably) ended economic and financial crisis has left serious marks on the deep structure of the Union, which seems feebler than ever in its history. What is currently contested by politicians and people alike is the very *raison d'être* of the European project: do we need a Union anymore? Should the European Union be abandoned or should it be revived and consolidated? These are serious and timely questions that require urgent attention. The 2014 EP elections offered a platform spread across Europe where issues such as the future of the EU could have been addressed. In this paper, we analyze the three debates between the candidates to the Presidency of the European Commission. We particularly focus on the scenarios for Europe proposed by three of the five main participants and examine their proposals against the arguments on the future of the European project made by established scholars and experts (i.e. federation, supranational democracy, Europe of nation states, an association of sovereign states, fiscal union, banking union, etc.)

Keywords

EP elections, future of the European Union, models of the EU

1. INTRODUCTION

Today's European Union is a fuzzy, unclear, goal-lacking structure undermined by the policy mistakes, bad economic reasoning and state-centred decision-making that more often than not has simply disregarded public consultation. The crisis has triggered disaffection among member states and has shaken the very idea of European unification that had originally stirred the pioneers of the Union to action. The crisis has impacted the European Union at all levels – political, economic, social – and the measures proposed to overcome it, particularly the austerity policies, have led to severe cuts to public spending and services, to falling incomes, high unemployment and deterioration of living standards in the countries that have been doubly hit by the crisis and austerity, too. Naturally, austerity policies have generated popular resentment and strong discontent with the Union. Furthermore, the significantly different ways in which member states (and especially the Eurozone countries) viewed the (counter-) productive nature of the imposed policies of austerity have contributed to the deepening of the gap between richer and poorer countries, between North and South, between responsible and irresponsible states. These powerful oppositions have been reflected in the *Us vs. Them* rhetoric of “the thrifty North and the lazy South” (Bohle 2010, 8) that is so widespread in the public discourse.

However, there is a silver lining in all this increasing irritation and contempt towards the EU's response to the crisis. While admitting that the EU has not yet found a strategy for exiting the crisis, there are voices who stress that the European project should be granted the needed support and that it should be redesigned according to the new political, economic and social realities of the global world. One of the enthusiastic supporters of the EU, Jürgen Habermas has mentioned in an interview that “Greece's debt crisis has had a welcome political side-effect” (Jeffries 2010, 8), in the sense that it has reinvigorated the debate over the future of Europe; the central problem of economic and political unification has been brought back to the fore.

The economic crisis has resurrected the old inquiry of the *finalité* of the European unification project: what kind of Europe? In an editorial in *The Guardian*, Ulrich Beck remarked that the crisis of the European Union could be turned into an opportunity for democracy (*The Guardian*, November 2011). Will Europe become a transnational democracy? A federal state? Will it become a

transnational democracy “overcoming social division and stratification within a global society” (Habermas 2003, 99)? Or will it transform into a more sophisticated intergovernmental organization? These are questions raised by both the critics and the supporters of the European project and they are well timed in a period of uncertainty and serious concern about the future of the European Union. A firm grasp of the pros and cons of European integration is required and the results of the analysis need to be presented and further discussed with both decision-making actors in member state and, more importantly, citizens across Europe. Who else than the elected President of the European Commission (EC), the executive body of the EU, would be more suited to lead the efforts to combat the lack of vision of the European project and to propose solutions to consolidate its viability? In this paper, we use discourse analytical tools to examine what and how have the candidates to the 2014 elections for EC presidency communicated about their vision of a united Europe. We analyze candidates’ proposals for the future European integration against the models of conceptualizing the European Union, as described in the literature.

2. CONCEPTUALIZING THE EUROPEAN UNION: STATEHOOD-CENTERED AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL INTERPRETATIONS

Defining the EU is a difficult task; a useful starting point in attempting to describe the Union is to compare it with the most important type of political organization that exists – the state. To a certain extent, the EU displays a number of typical characteristics of statehood. Therefore, the concept of state is helpful in understanding and promoting the nature of the EU. Thus, the key characteristics of the state – territoriality, sovereignty, legitimacy and monopoly of governance (Nugent 1999) – are present with the EU, although in a partial and limited way. To the traditional statehood-centred conceptualization of the Union, an intergovernmental perspective is added, which helps provide a view of the EU as voluntarily based cooperation between national governments that agree to work together for reasons of mutual benefit. To the current stage of its development, the EU has progressed beyond the strict cooperation of member states favoured by economic and political mutual advantages. The Union has incorporated many of the features

of a supranational unit into its structure and functioning. Nonetheless, there is still evidence (usually surfacing in times of crisis) of self-interested decisions made by member states with respect to various EU-related policies and actions. Perhaps the most difficult to solve shortcoming of the EU as an intergovernmental organization is that, within this type of arrangement, “political calculations are driven by domestic concerns” (George and Bache 2001, 13). Replacing the state-centred political calculations with the EU-centred political decision-making is an arduous journey that the national government representatives together with EU officials have to make together.

As far as the more commonly used conceptualizations of the EU are concerned, we will briefly outline three of them. First, the federalist model; there has been a constant preoccupation, and disagreement, at the same time, among member states with respect to a prospective evolution of the EU into a federation. There was even a clash between the UK government and other member state governments whether such a provision should be included in the Maastricht Treaty or not (Nugent 1999). The Union does display some federal traits, while, at the same time, falling short in some respects of the federal model. Power is divided between central decision-making institutions (e.g. the European Council, the EC, the EP, etc.), the nature of decisions made at the level of the EU is specified in official documents and there is a supreme judicial authority (the European Court of Justice). However, despite the fact the power is divided, the policy balance is tilted towards the member states. For instance, there are still cases where the unanimity rule applies in the Council (e.g. enlargement, fiscal policies), although the responsibility of the respective policies lies with the European Commission. Finally, a major difference between the EU and a federal state is that there are policy areas that normally are the responsibility of central authorities, but in the case of the EU these areas are primarily national responsibilities (e.g. security and defence, foreign affairs). In light of these facts, it appears that a more appropriate way of labelling the EU would be as a confederation, a union of sovereign nation states defined by treaty and in which supranational institutions exist, but their power is dependent on the power of their counterparts in national states (Nugent 1999).

The second model that we briefly discuss here is the state-centric one advanced by those who take an intergovernmental approach to the integration process. From an intergovernmental point of view, the EU as a supra-national

structure rests on nation states that have chosen to cooperate for precise purposes, provided that this cooperation serves their interests. Consequently, no government is obliged to accept any decision made at the EU level on issues to which they express an opposition. National governments control the overall direction in which the EU should develop. Supranational institutions (the EC, the European Court of Justice, the EP) do not have powers in their own right, instead they function as “agents and facilitators of the collective will” (Nugent 1999, 498).

Finally, the multi-level governance model conceives the EU as a polity in which power and influence are exercised at multiple levels of government. In contrast to the intergovernmental view in which national governments could ultimately limit the power of EU institutions, in the case of multi-level governance, supranational European institutions are created to assist nation governments, but they are not under close control of the latter. Critics of the multi-level governance model focus on the difficulty to secure unanimous agreement among member states that could facilitate the functioning of supranational institutions (George and Bache 2001, 26).

These three commonly used approaches to conceptualize and explain the EU attempt to adapt democratic models of governance from state-level to European-level. However, such a transference is not unproblematic since there are significant and apparently insurmountable differences between the inherent features of statehood and the structure and operation of the EU.

3. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE PARADOX OF DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT

Much scholarly debate over the functioning and the performance of the EU is organized around the existence of the so called ‘democratic deficit’. However, when it comes to pinpointing what precisely the democratic deficit is, how it is manifested within the EU and how it impacts upon the future of the integration process, many opinions arise and it is rather difficult to find the lowest common denominator of such points of view. Summarizing the discussions so far, we can explain the EU’s democratic deficit in terms of ineffective performance of EU democratic politics (Koopmans and Statham 2010), lack of responsibility and accountability of EU decision-makers (Trenz

and Eder 2004; Scharpf 2003), the increasing legitimacy crisis of the Union (Scharpf 2003, 2012), the weaknesses and the institutional deficit of the Eurozone exposed by the crisis (Habermas 2011). Furthermore, Habermas considers that the democracy deficit is also directly connected to European leaders' continuously decreasing devotion to the European integration project and to the idea of a genuine federal union. It seems that the European leaders experience a *fatigue*, which makes them focus less on solutions to the current problems of the Union and more likely to dodge them (Habermas 2012).

Since there is no unifying account of the EU's democratic deficit, and there is even less consensus over the solutions to this problem, alternative radical proposals concerning the matter under discussion have been put forward. According to Moravcsik, such democratic deficit is a myth, "whether we define it as an absence of public accountability or as a crisis of legitimacy" (Moravcsik 2008, 340). Moreover, he adds that "there is little evidence that the EU suffers from a fundamental democratic deficit" (Moravcsik 2002, 621).

However, the intensification of the debate over the democratic deficit of the EU has proven to be beneficial to the process of democratizing the Union. This is the "paradox of democracy within the EU" (Trenz and Eder 2004, 7): the discourse on the democratic deficit is itself part of the European public sphere, of the public communication of EU-related issues, which contribute to the unfolding of the process of democratization within the EU.

In addition to the democratic deficit (and as a proof of its existence), growing voices from the academic community have warned about the absence of a genuine 'European *demos*' (Trenz and Eder 2004; Moravcsik and Sangiovanni 2002; Eriksen 2009). The flourishing literature in the field shows an evolution of the views on the possibilities of existence of a European public from "stark pessimism – no European *demos* – to stark optimism – a European *demos sui generis* (de Beus 2010, 32). Some scholars even admit that the lack of a European public is perpetuated by the fact that discourse on the topic is deprived of mobilizing power. Thus, "in order to give individuals a reason to care about EU politics, it is necessary to give them a stake in it – a fact that many discussions of a *demos*, 'we-feeling', 'community', and 'constitutional patriotism' elide (Moravcsik 2002, 616).

The question of the absence of a European *demos* is relevant to the prospects of democracy within the EU. A more pronounced democratic deficit within the EU results in a greater remoteness of the Union from its citizens, which

naturally leads to a decrease in solidarity. European solidarity is a question of specific mechanisms, of common interests and of shared responsibility of all member states; at the same time, solidarity is also a matter of communicating and sharing common experiences in the EU. The crisis has contributed to the exacerbation of the 'solidarity deficit' within the EU, and especially within the countries of the Eurozone that have been severely hit by the financial and economic downturn. Additionally, political detachment from the popular voice, lack of supervision and accountability in the decision-making process and the absence of a homogenous European *demos* have led to a crisis of both input legitimacy – people's consent and agreement with EU's policies and actions – and output legitimacy – the results of EU's actions and their acceptance by the people (Scharpf 1998, 2003, 2012; Moravcsik and Sangiovanni 2002). The acknowledgement of the democratic deficit currently characterizing the European Union has led to subsequent calls for re-democratization (Eriksen 2009).

4. MONITORING THE DEMOCRATIC EUROPEAN UNION

There are several criteria for auditing the democratic practices in the European Union; however, the elections to the European Parliament provide the primary mechanism for monitoring democracy and, more importantly, for attributing accountability within the Union (Hobolt and Tilley 2014). The EP elections offer European citizens the opportunity to assess the performance of the EU and the results of such assessment could undermine the output legitimacy of the EU and the public support for European integration (Scharpf 2003). Democratic theories describe elections as a control and sanctioning mechanism exercised by voters who either reward or punish the performance of governments and politicians. By means of elections, voters assign responsibility and attribute blame for what they consider inefficient policies and bad governance. However, assigning responsibility and blaming are no clear-cut tasks, especially within supra-national political entities such as the EU, where voters are often confused by the multiple levels of government which they are supposed to evaluate and assign responsibility to for particular policies and actions. Despite successive treaty reforms aimed at consolidating democratic accountability and reducing democratic deficit within the EU

(Hobolt and Tilley 2014), the quality of the democratic process is still doubted by many experts and scholars.

As far as the elections to the European Parliament are concerned, the literature in the field focuses primarily on their second order nature. In their analysis of the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, Reif and Schmitt (1980) contrast second-order elections (e.g. regional, municipal, county, etc.) to first-order elections (national parliamentary elections, presidential elections), arguing that the most important aspect characterizing the former is that there is “less at stake” (1980, p. 9). Thus, not only do the EP elections fail to spark public interest in themselves, but they also fall short to motivate citizens to develop interest and engagement in EU politics (de Vreese 2009). The second order nature of the European elections raises questions with regard to the extent to which these elections actually allow voters to assign responsibility and to hold EU institutions and their leaders accountable for their performance. Hobolt and Tilley reasonably make inquiries into the possibility that the link between economic performance and electoral outcomes (the so-called economic voting) could be transferred from national to EP elections (Hobolt and Tilley 2014, 126). While economic voting is clearly important to exert democratic control, democracy is more than evaluating policy outputs in the interest of citizens (Follesdal and Hix 2006). A genuine representative democracy, which the EU apparently aspires to be, requires competition, deliberation and contestation of political leadership. The Union currently lacks such democratic tools to be used in a genuine electoral contest where both political leadership and policy performance could be contested by voters.

The recent 2014 European Parliament elections have set the scene for an indirect contestation of EU policymakers and EU leadership, which is still better than no contestation at all. For the first time in the history of European elections, voters had an indirect say in the election of the President of the EC, the executive body of the Union, the main institution responsible for the performance of the EU. The candidates were nominated by the major political parties and alliances in the EP and their electoral success depended indirectly on the Europeans’ vote for those parties and alliances.

Thus, contrary to previous elections, during this year’s round, there has been electoral contest for political leadership at the European level. Five nominees have entered the race for the presidency of the EC. In what follows, we analyze the three debates between the five candidates to the Presidency of the

European Commission. We particularly focus on the scenarios for Europe proposed by three of the five debaters and examine their proposals against the possible models of the European Union discussed in the literature (federal state, intergovernmental organization, a special type of multi-level governance, etc.).

5. THE FUTURE OF EUROPE SEEN BY CANDIDATES TO THE EC PRESIDENCY IN THE 2014 ELECTIONS

In an attempt to bolster voter turnout, the official run-up slogan of the 2014 European elections read “This time is different!”. For the first time in the history of the EP elections, Europe’s political parties proposed their candidates for the European Commission presidency ahead of the citizens’ vote and governments’ proposals, with the intention to change the general perception that European elections are second-order elections. This move is certainly an indication of an increasing quality in European democracy. It sets the scene for genuine political contest over different leadership visions for Europe and over competing political agendas. Despite being the first exercise of democratic contestation and deliberation of political leadership within the EU, the race to EC presidency did not lack heated debates over the direction the European Union should take and the most appropriate policy agenda that it should have. Given the context outlined in the previous sections of this paper, we have focused on the solutions that the politicians who entered the race have put forward to solve the pressing issue of the EU’s lack of strategic vision for the future. We have analyzed three electoral debates held in April and May 2014, in different member states.

5.1. The debates and the candidates

For methodological reasons, we have analyzed only the contributions of three of the five candidates in the race for President of the European Commission, namely Jean-Claude Juncker, proposed by the European Popular Party, Martin Schulz, whose candidature was supported by the Party of European Socialists and Guy Verhofstadt, nominated by the Alliance of Democrats and Liberals for Europe Group. There were three other candidates that were screened out of

our analysis for different reasons: first, Alexis Tsipras, candidate of the Party of the European Left, who only used Greek in the debates, which made it impossible for us to follow his arguments. Second, we also excluded Ska Keller and Jose Bove's contributions from the analysis. They were both nominated by the European Green Party, a rather bizarre approach, considering that the position was originally designed to be filled by only one person. Furthermore, the two candidates alternated their participation to the debates, which led to different views on the future of the European Union held by two people ideally fulfilling the same leadership position.

There were three debates reuniting all candidates, which we have included in our study (there was one exception to this rule: Alexis Tsipras did not participate to the debates held in Maastricht and in Florence, respectively, but this did not impact on our findings, since his contribution was excluded from our analysis, based on the above-mentioned argument). Thus, the first electoral debate was held on April 28 in Maastricht and focused on three main themes: the European economy, crisis and growth; the future of Europe and rise of Euroscepticism; and Europe's foreign policy role. The second debate was held in Florence on May 9, 2014, and tackled topics such as: the EU's future, actions to improve EU governance, institutional challenges to the functioning of the EU, voter turnout for the EP elections, the EU's role in the globalized world. Finally, the third and last debate was held in Brussels on May 15. The main topics addressed by the candidates were: Europe's financial crisis, international affairs and Europe's social and ethical issues.

5.2. Three visions of the future European Union

As per rule, in their opening statements, each of the three candidates described their vision with respect to the future of the European Union. During all three encounters, they successively reinforced their views with respect to the model that the European integration should be built on. When analyzed against the established models of the European Union described in the literature, only one of the candidates has put forward a vision of Europe compatible with the federal model. Guy Verhofstadt of the ALDE Group repeatedly emphasized the need for a more integrated Europe.

“...with are with our European consistent and European Union on a crossroads. We need to make a very important choice; or the choice to go back to our nation states as some...some candidates are proposing, or to go forward in the sense of a more integrated Europe. [...] We need European cooperation, we need a European Union who is stronger and can defend its model against China, against India, against the US” (Brussels Debate, 15 May 2014).

Verhofstadt envisions a Europe strong enough to compete with established and emerging economies of the world. He considers that the future of the EU is a question of choice between a limited national government-constrained agreement between member states and a strategic vision of a more integrated Europe. Interestingly, he uses a common metaphorical framing used in politics too, namely *progress is going forward*. If the Union is to perform better and become a powerful player on the world’s chessboard, then it should definitely make efforts to foster economic, political, social integration.

“...I think we can only emerge from this crisis if you do a jump forward in European integration. And that is at stake in these elections. [...] I think the way forward is not making EU debts, is not the status quo or saying for example that we are already outside of the crisis. [...] We are still in the middle of the crisis and the way out is to do a more integrated Europe, integrating our banks, integrating our capital markets, integrating our energy markets, integrating digital services in Europe, integrating telecom. If we do that we use the scale of Europe to emerge from the crisis. What I want to do if I become the President of the Commission is what Delors did in the ‘90s: a new wave into the internal market so that we use the scale of Europe to emerge from this crisis and to create also companies from the size as Twitter, as Google, as Facebook who are today only American companies. Why we could not make also big European ones?” (Florence Debate, 9 May 2014).

By contrasting the EU to the US, Verhofstadt is reinforcing the old idea of United States of Europe as a model of consolidated federal Union. Despite the enthusiasm and the involvement that the ALDE candidate put into this view of Europe, it is unlikely that the US-inspired super federation would ever come into being. Nonetheless, it would be unfair to simply dismiss Verhofstadt’s vision of a federal Europe by qualifying it overenthusiastic. In fact, the idea of a federation is not entirely new and, more importantly, this idea should not be considered as some kind of revelation that struck politicians in the context of the economic crisis. Jean Monnet is reported to have held similar views, mentioning that the goal is to produce the political union, which could be done

via money, the European economic unity being a means to achieve the ultimate goal – EU as a self-contained political entity (Duchene 1994).

A different but not entirely opposing view of the future of the EU is proposed by the socialist candidate Martin Schulz. He has almost obsessively repeated the idea that the Union should be “just and fair” and that its main goal should be combating tax evasion, tax fraud and speculating techniques in the EU.

“...in the European Union, speculators make billions of profits and don’t pay taxes, but when they make billions of losses, the tax payers have to pay for them. [...] Whole generations in some of the member states of our continent run the risk to pay with their life chances for a crisis that other irresponsible people have caused” (Brussels Debate, 15 May 2014).

As a German, Schulz’s view of the future of Europe is tributary to the politics run in the EU and especially to the austerity measures imposed on the crisis-hit Eurozone countries by Chancellor Merkel. Schulz apparently makes no effort to sweeten the moral judgment that he makes when referring to countries that behaved irresponsibly during the crisis. He seems to believe that there is an economic discipline that should be enforced upon some of the member states and that this is the right way to advance the European integration.

“...the fight against tax evasion and tax fraud is one of the highest priorities; secondly, the many we get out of the fight against tax evasion and tax fraud we use to overcome the credit crunch, especially in those countries where the relaunch of economy is most difficult” (Florence Debate, 9 May 2014).

Schulz emphasizes the importance of maintaining the austerity measures where they are needed in order to impose a fiscal discipline, an idea that is rejected by Verhofstadt, who agrees with fiscal discipline, but fears the unproductive discussion surrounding the austerity measures. However, the candidate of the Party of European Socialists states that the austerity measures are unavoidable, but, at the same time, he acknowledges that these measures (especially budgetary cuts) should have been accompanied by a growth and investment strategy.

“....the combination between budgetary discipline on one hand, which is unavoidable and necessary, and strategic investment in growth and employment, that was the better way.

[...] what we never discussed is the fight against tax evasion and tax fraud" (Brussels Debate, 15 May 2014).

The third view on the future of the European Union is more in line with defending the current status quo of the Union. It is held by the candidate nominated by the European Popular Party, Jean-Claude Juncker, who eventually won the race and became the President of the European Commission. Throughout all three debates, Juncker voiced the opinions held by people who are in favour of keeping with the current policies and actions of the Union. He holds a sort of idealistic view of a Union of solidarity, in which attention should be paid to the "big issues". Also, he is the only candidate to use both French and English in his interventions.

"...Je voudrais que l'Europe devienne solidaire ; je voudrais qu'on mette fin à la division entre Nord et Sud, qu'on remplace la dette par les idées. [...] L'Europe aura un grand problème si elle s'occupe de petites choses" (Brussels Debate, 15 May 2014).

Juncker is also the only one to defend the Barroso Commission against the criticism coming from both Schulz and Verhofstadt. He reminds the two of them that they have also been part of the current functioning of the EU, and that they could have done more instead of only sanctioning the performance of the Commission.

"...the problem with this Commission (i.e. The Barroso Commission) was the leadership. The Commission cannot be the secretary to the European Council, they have to lead, it is the only institution that has the right of initiative in Europe; the only one that can put proposals on the table; we cannot ask for green light in Berlin" (Verhofstadt - Florence Debate, 9 May 2014).

"...I am the only one who can defend what has been done, because the others give the impression that they were nowhere when it came to the responses that we had to give to the crisis. I don't think that the Commission has made major mistakes. At the very beginning of the crisis we didn't have tools and instruments to fight against the crisis and together with the Parliament, that behave responsibly, we tried to define these instruments and now we have them. What I don't like is that these instruments are an intergovernmental creation; I would have liked these instruments to be introduced in the Treaty" (Juncker - Florence Debate, 9 May 2014).

Juncker is pleading for a Europeanized Union, a Europe of nation states with institutions that govern, as it's already happening, through mutually agreed

treaties. He is mostly in favour of maintaining the current status quo as long as it is refined so as to ensure solidarity among citizens and member states.

6. CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that the European Union is currently at a crossroads. This has been long acknowledged by European experts, politicians and more recently by the candidates to the EC presidency during the 2014 European elections. Whether openly put forward or not, Europe's lack of strategic vision is the strongest threat to the future of the European project. The alternative is grim: breaking up the Union may be more costly than keeping it together. Thus, there was hope that the 2014 EP elections will put forward a future model of the Union, a solution to the uncertainty surrounding the evolution of this project. Apparently, such hope is yet to be fulfilled since the problem of the future of the EU has been pushed farther into the...future. Meanwhile, the EU is muddling through the current status-quo.

The new algorithm used in the 2014 EP elections in order to elect the President of the European Commission has set the scene, for the first time in the history of European elections, for a genuine political contest in which different leadership visions of the EU have been proposed by the candidates who have entered the race. In this paper, we have analyzed the prospects of the European Union as viewed by three of the five politicians who fought to become President of the EC. We examined their participation to three electoral debates and found out that only one of them has strongly advocated the need for a new model of the EU. In spite of the fact that his proposal of a federal European Union similar to the United States has little support among scholars and other politicians, this was the only radically different approach to the EU and to its problems that a candidate brought to the electoral debates. The contributions of the other two candidates investigated in this paper did not include suggestions of distinct models of the Union. The socialist and the popular candidates have chosen to support and only slightly refine the current organization of the EU.

There are at least two interesting remarks that can be made on the electoral debates analyzed here. First, none of the three candidates has explored in any way an innovative vision or model of the EU worthy of implementation. They

all focused either on idealistic and improbable solutions (the United States of Europe), or on limited changes to the current status quo, which does not seem to be working well either. Secondly, on a positive note, these elections were the first to open the way for authentic political competition within the EU, which can only lead to an increase in the quality of democracy of the EU and, in the long run, to a more viable and widely accepted solution for the EU's lack of strategic vision.

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- *** Florence Debate for the Presidency of the European Commission - 9 May 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n-MCFBgv5RU&autoplay=1>.
- *** Maastricht Debate for the Presidency of the European Commission - 28 April 2014, <http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/player.cfm?ref=I088807>.